ABSTRACT The impact of strategic consumers' disappointment aversion preference on retailer's inventory decision and profit when the retailer adopts quantity commitment strategy is studied in this paper. By comparing with the situation without quantity commitment, we analyze the effectiveness of this strategy. Through analytical analysis, we have the following conclusions. First, the optimal inventory level with quantity commitment is lower than that without quantity commitment, and both of them have positive correlations with the level of consumers' disappointment aversion. That is, consumers' disappointment aversion can mitigate the negative impact of their strategic behavior on the retailer's profit. Second, when other parameters are fixed and consumers' disappointment aversion level is below a certain threshold, the quantity commitment strategy is effective. However, when the cost is high, or consumer's valuation is low, or the salvage price is low, and at the same time if consumers' disappointment aversion level is high, then quantity commitment strategy can be ineffective. Finally, there are corresponding parameter intervals, when other parameters are fixed, the retailer's profit increment (when it is effective) by adopting quantity commitment strategy is positively related to consumers' valuation and salvage price of the product, and negatively related to the product cost. All our conclusions are illustrated in detail by numerical examples.
I. INTRODUCTION
On the day of the ''Double Eleven'' in 2018, the e-commerce platform Tmall in China achieved a record high of 213.5 billion RMB on the basis of long-term extensively publicity and high discounts. Nowadays, there is a fierce price war between major e-commerce platforms, and the platforms keep attracting consumers' purchases through discounts. And it also reflects a trend that consumers choosing to buy products in promotion periods. That is, consumers no longer passively accept the prices of retailers, and they will make decisions on when to buy products by collecting all kinds of information to maximize their utility. In reality, consumers will face uncertain outcomes when making purchase decisions and have a rational expectation of the results. If consumers
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choose to wait to buy products at a discount, they may face two outcomes. One is that consumers buy the products at a low price, since the actual result exceeds expectation, consumers feel elated. The other is that the products have been sold out before the discount, since consumers do not get the products, the actual result cannot reach the expected level, and consumers have a sense of disappointment. This psychological perception will increase (or decrease) the utility of consumers in economic activities. Extensive empirical studies have shown that most consumers are disappointment aversion. Under the same result difference, consumers have a stronger sense of disappointment than elation.
With the development of information technology, the behavior of strategic consumers has become a common economic phenomenon, which has attracted extensive attention from the industry and academia. However, the existing research mainly focused on the impact of actual economic payoffs on consumers' purchasing behavior. Few literatures take into account consumers' psychological perception factors. This work considers consumers' disappointment aversion perception and studies the effectiveness of quantity commitment strategy taken by retailers to reduce the loss of profits when faced with this type of strategic consumers. In theory, this work will expand existing research on strategic consumers' behavior and behavioral decision-making. In practice, the conclusions of this work can bring certain management implications to relevant retail firms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We firstly review related literatures in Section II. In Section III, the definition of rational expectation equilibrium and the decisionmaking model between a retailer and strategic consumers with disappointment aversion are established. In Section IV, we introduce the quantity commitment strategy, and compare the optimal inventory quantities and the corresponding profits of the retailer in the two situations with and without quantity commitment. In Section V, effectiveness of quantity commitment and impacts of parameters on the effectiveness of quantity commitment are analyzed. Some specific numerical examples are presented to further explain our main conclusions in Section VI. In Section VII, we summarize the full text and give some possible expansions of our model.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW A. STRATEGIC CONSUMER
Our research is related to strategic consumers, whose strategic buying behavior has been widely concerned by scholars in the field of operations management. Coase [1] first analyzed the impact of consumers' strategic behavior on retailer's pricing and profit in durable goods markets. The results showed that consumers' strategic behavior can induce consumers predict the price trend and wait for the price to be reduced, resulting in the durable goods monopoly finally obtaining zero profit. In the case of uncertain demand, Aviv and Pazgal [2] studied the optimal pricing for limited quantity and fashion-like seasonal goods in the presence of forward-looking (strategic) customers. They conducted a comprehensive numerical study to explore the impact of strategic consumers on the retailer's pricing and its expected revenue performance. Based on the classic newsvendor model, Su and Zhang [3] adopted the rational expectation hypothesis to study the strategic equilibrium of retailers and consumers by introducing consumers' strategic behavior. By comparing to consumers without strategic behavior, they showed that consumers' strategic behavior could bring huge profit loss to retailers. Ye and Sun [4] considered a newsvendor who sells a single kind of products over a single season with the objective of determining both the selling price and stock quantity to maximize the expected profit. In their model, the customers are strategic and they considered two demand cases of additive and multiplicative. The results demonstrated that neglecting the price-sensitivity of demand would lead the newsvendor to make sub-optimal decisions. Wang et al. [5] studied pricing strategies of a seller with budget constraints when facing two types of strategic consumers with different search costs, and proposed three pricing strategies to motivate consumers to visit. Cachon and Swinney [6] studied the pricing and inventory of two-period sales model of retailers under the fixed regular sales price, and analyzed the value of retailers' quick response by introducing three types of consumers. The results showed that under relatively mild conditions, the value of quick response to a retailer is much greater in the presence of strategic consumers than without them. Song and Zhao [7] considered a newsvendor model with strategic customers who are bounded rational. Based on the classic newsvendor model, Du et al. [8] addressed the single-period joint inventory and pricing problem in the presence of strategic customers with risk preference and decreasing valuation. Wang and Hu [9] introduced consumers' strategic behavior and risk preference in the newsvendor model. They analyzed the rational expectation equilibrium of the risk-averse newsvendor and strategic consumers. The results showed that the equilibrium pricing for the risk-averse newsvendor is lower than that of the riskneutral retailer and the equilibrium stocking quantity for the risk-averse newsvendor is higher than that of the risk-neutral retailer.
We also target strategic consumers in this paper. Similar to the above references, we model the retailer's optimal order quantity under demand uncertainty based on the newsvendor model, and analyze the behavior of the retailer and strategic consumers by rational expectation equilibrium. Different from these work, we introduce consumers' disappointment aversion and further analyze the impact of this preference on the effectiveness of the retailer's quantity commitment strategy. The results obtained can further enrich the existing research on strategic consumers.
B. DYNAMIC PRICING
Given the negative impact of consumers' strategic behavior, retailers need to adjust pricing to attract consumers to purchase. Dynamic pricing has attracted wide attention in this field. Besanko and Winsto [10] considered the intertemporal pricing problem for a monopolist marketing a new product, and analyzed the game problem between firms and strategic consumers through price discrimination strategy, in which consumers' strategic behavior was first included in the study of dynamic pricing. Dasu and Tong [11] studied dynamic pricing policies for a monopolist selling perishable products over a finite time horizon to strategic buyers. They investigated two pricing schemes that called posted and contingent pricing. The results showed that dynamic pricing is only useful when strategic buyers can perceive scarcity. Kremer et al. [12] investigated retailers' dynamic pricing decisions in a stylized two-period setting with possible supply constraints and demand from both myopic and strategic consumers. They found that the fraction of strategic consumers in the market systematically moderates the optimal pricing structure. On the premise that the price of the second period is fixed, Aviv and Pazgal [2] demonstrated VOLUME 7, 2019 that when there are strategic consumers in the market, the price of the second period will not change with inventory. That is to say, the strategy of fixing the price of the second period can bring more profits to retailers than the strategy of changing the price of the second period. Liu et al. [13] examined the use of price-commitment policies in dynamic contracting and in multiple-period or finite-time horizons. Cachon and Feldman [14] introduced a third type pricing strategy, in which the firm begins with a high (nondiscounted) price but commits to discount frequently even if discounting lowers revenue. They showed that if the firm can choose its capacity, then discounting frequently can be the only profitable strategy and without price commitment, overinvesting in capacity to attract consumers is a poor strategy. Levin et al. [15] presented a new model for revenue management of product sales that incorporates both dynamic pricing and price guarantee. Lai et al. [16] examined the impact of a posterior price matching policy on consumers' purchasing behavior, the seller's pricing and inventory decisions, and their expected payoffs. More information about dynamic pricing can be obtained in the research of Chen and Chen [17] .
Our research can be seen as a special case of dynamic pricing. In our model, there are two phases. The price in the first stage is the decision variable of the retailer, and the price in the second stage is an exogenous variable. There are multiple stages, and different stages have different commodity prices, which is the same as dynamic pricing. But in our model, the price in the second stage is not determined by the retailer, which is different from dynamic pricing.
C. QUANTITY COMMITMENT
Previous studies have already shown that quantity commitment is a kind of effective strategies to encourage consumers to buy in advance and to mitigate the adverse effects of strategic consumer behavior. For instance, Su and Zhang [3] found that retailers can alleviate the negative impact of strategic consumer behaviors by implementing quantity commitment and price commitment, and they took the profits realized under quantity commitment as the profit benchmark of the supply chain for follow-up studies. Essentially, the retailer's quantity commitment makes use of the limited inventory to make consumers realize that if they wait to buy at residual value, the products may be out of stock, thus inducing consumers to buy the product in advance. In this field, Liu and Ryzin [18] investigated whether it is optimal for a firm to create rationing risk by deliberately understocking products. They showed that the resulting threat of shortages created an incentive for customers to purchase early at higher prices, and by limiting the inventory quantity, the adverse impact caused by strategic consumer behavior was alleviated. Huang and Qian [19] developed a stylized modeling framework to answer is it optimal for a firm to create rationing risk by deliberately understocking products. They show that the result of strategic capacity rationing being suboptimal is fairly robust to different valuation distributions and utility functions, heterogeneous sample size, and price optimization.
Nasser and Turcic [20] analyzed whether different retailers adopt quantity commitments through a multi-level game. It turns out that when the degree of product differentiation is quite low, both companies choose to commit to a balanced quantity.
We focus on the quantity commitment strategy of retailers in this paper. The same as the above literature, we also prove that quantity commitment is essential to reduce the amount of inventory quantity to convey the scarcity of goods to consumers, so as to achieve the purpose of allowing consumers to purchase in advance. Different from the existing literature, we demonstrate that quantity commitment strategy may be ineffective when there are disappointment aversion strategic consumers. We have also given some sufficient conditions under which this strategy is ineffective. The results obtained can further enrich the existing research on the quantity commitment strategy.
D. DISAPPOINTMENT AVERSION
When consumers make decisions under uncertain conditions, they produce different psychological reactions by comparing actual results with their expected results. When the actual results exceed their expectations, consumers will have a psychological reaction of elation; when the actual results do not meet expectations, there will be a disappointing psychological reaction. According to previous studies, when the difference in results is the same, most people's perception of disappointment is more obvious [21] - [23] . Disappointment has been extensively studied in literatures on psychology and behavioral decision-making. Loomes and Sugden [22] argued that the central proposition of disappointment theory is that an individual forms expectations about uncertain prospects, changing the basic utility based on the comparison of expected and actual results. Bell [24] analyzed the meaning of disappointment through the example of lottery and incorporated the concept of disappointment into utility theory. By incorporating a simple disappointment-elation function into a model of individual choice, many observed violations of conventional expected utility axioms can be predicted and defended as rational and dynamically consistent behavior. Instead of comparing actual results with expected results, Delquié and Cillo [25] developed a model to compare individual results with those of others, thus better reflecting the way in which individuals endure disappointment. This provides a clear psychological rationale for the subjective transformation of probabilities. Nasiry and Popescu [26] characterized the effect of anticipated regret on consumer decisions and on firm profits and policies in an advance selling context where buyers have uncertain valuations. From the perspective of psychology and behavioral decision science, regret and disappointment are two distinct psychological phenomena, which are based on different reasons and theories. Regret is that ''the presence of a negative outcome'', while disappointment is that ''the absence of a positive outcome'' [27] . On the basis of previous studies, Liu and Shum [28] analyzed the pricing and inventory decisions made by retailers in the face of disappointment aversion consumers by studying the twoperiods pricing model, and analyzed the impact of the two pricing policies of price increase and price decrease in the later stage. The results showed that in the case of price cuts, retailers always benefited from disappointment and aversion by using appropriate stock levels during low price periods. However, in the case of rising prices, whether it is beneficial for firms to cause disappointment and aversion depends on how consumers obtain benefits in different periods when utility is formed. Du et al. [29] characterized the effect of consumers' anticipated disappointment aversion behavior on the optimal pricing decisions of retailers with or without inventory constraint in the omnichannel environment. The results showed when a retailer operates in dual-channel and faces offline inventory constraint, the concern for consumers' homogeneous disappointment aversion changes the threshold above which the retailer implements different channel pricing strategies.
The most relevant literatures in this paper are the studies of Su and Zhang [3] and Liu and Shum [28] . The former analyzed the role of quantity commitments and price commitments in mitigating the adverse effects of strategic consumer behavior. Different from their work, we further consider the impact of psychological factors on consumers' utility. Specifically, we add disappointment aversion preference into consumers' utility function, and analyze the impact of disappointment aversion level of strategic consumers on the effectiveness of quantity commitment strategy for the retailer to improve its profit. Especially, we prove that under some conditions, quantity commitment strategy can be ineffective when there are disappointment aversion consumers, which is different from their conclusions. The latter studied the twophase dynamic pricing problem. It analyzed different effects of price reduction and price increase in the second stage on retailers' pricing and inventory decision-making when the probability of consumers waiting to buy was fixed with disappointment aversion strategic consumers. In this work, the probability that the consumer waiting to buy obtaining the product in the second stage is determined according to the retailer's inventory Q in the first stage, which is a function of Q, whereas Liu and Shum's model takes it as a decision variable of the retailer in the second stage. In addition, the price in the second stage of this paper is determined by the market clearing price and is an exogenous parameter, whereas it is taken as a decision variable in Liu & Shum's model.
III. DECISION MODEL AND EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
This paper is based on the classic newsvendor model. We assume that only a retailer in the market sells one kind of products during a single sales season, and consumer demand X ≥ 0 is random. Let F(·) and f (·) denote the distribution and density function of the random demand respectively. Assume that the demand distribution has increasing failure efficiency; that is f (x) (1 − F(x)) increases with x. In fact, many distributions in reality satisfy this property, such as normal distribution, uniform distribution, exponential distribution, and so on. Assume that f (·) is continuous and has a continuous interval of f (·) > 0. The retailer's cost per unit of products is c, and the consumer's valuation of the product is v.
To introduce consumers' strategic behavior, consumers are allowed to buy at regular price p during the sales season or at salvage price s when the market clears at the end of the sales season. We assume that s < c < p < v. Consumers who wait to buy a product at a lower price will face two outcomes. One situation is that products are not sold out at the end of the sales season, and waiting consumers can get the product at the residual price. In this situation, the actual result of waiting is better than their expectations, and consumers will be psychological elation, under which their psychological satisfaction will be positive. And the greater the difference between actual results and their expectations, the greater the psychological elation of consumers. The other case is that the products are in short supply. If products are completely sold out before the end of the sales season, the waiting consumer will not get the product. In this situation, the actual result of waiting is worse than what they expect, and consumers will be disappointed, under which their psychological satisfaction will be negative. And the greater the difference between actual results and expectations, the greater the degree of disappointment for consumers. Retailers need to make decisions about regular price p and inventory quantity Q. The decision of retailers will affect the decision of consumers to buy immediately or wait to buy.
Our model is different from the classic newsvendor model by introducing consumers' strategic behavior. At the same time, psychological factors of consumers are also introduced to analyze the impact of different outcomes on consumer purchasing decisions. Bell [24] believes that the utility function of consumers is: utility = economic payoffs + psychological satisfaction. Liu & Shum [28] proposed a dual-outcome utility model based on the formula
where consumers may get benefits x with probability p, or they can also get benefits y with probability 1 − p, x > y. The consumer's expected economic payoff is u = xp + y (1 − p). According to Bell model, if the profit of consumers is x, the reason for elation is the difference between x and u; If the profit of consumers is y, then the reason for disappointment is the difference between y and u. Let e ≥ 0 indicate the extent to which elation affects consumers' utility, and d ≥ 0 indicate the extent to which disappointment affects consumers' utility. Therefore, the total expected utility function for consumers is
where k = d − e, and k is the difference between the effect of disappointment and elation on utility. k < 0 indicates that under the same difference between the actual result and VOLUME 7, 2019 the expectation, consumers' psychological elation is greater than psychological disappointment, that is, the consumers are speculation elation type. When k = 0, it shows that under the same difference, consumers' elation and disappointment have the same effect on utility, that is, consumers are neutral. When k > 0, it shows that under the same difference, consumers' psychological disappointment is greater than psychological elation, that is, consumers are the disappointment aversion type. According to empirical research, a large number of consumers are the disappointment aversion type. Therefore, this work mainly studies the retailer's quantity commitment strategy and its effectiveness with disappointment aversion strategic consumers. Because consumers have strategic behavior, they may change their buying strategy when they realize that the product can be obtained at a low price after the end of the sales season. Without considering the influence of psychological factors on consumers purchasing behavior, when the regular price is too high, consumers may choose to wait for the residual price to purchase. They think that waiting is worthwhile, although they may face the risk of shortage at the end of the season. Let r denote consumers' reserve price, which depends on the probability that the consumer can obtain the product in the residual market. If the probability that the consumer obtains the product with residual price is positive, then r < v; If the probability is zero, then r = v. Whether a consumer can get a product in the residual market or the probability of getting it depends on the retailer's inventory quantity Q.
In the model, the retailer's decisions include regular price p and inventory quantity Q. Consumers can observe the price of the product determined by the retailer, but cannot observe the inventory of the retailer. The retailer cannot observe consumers' reserve price r for the product. Therefore, the retailer and consumers both form corresponding belief in unobservable information. The retailer form a belief in consumers' reserve price ξ r , and consumers form a belief in the probability ξ p that products can be purchased in the salvage market.
A. CONSUMERS' DECISION MODEL
In the trading market, consumers can choose to buy the product immediately at regular price p. They can also choose to wait until the end of the sales season to obtain the product at residual price s. When they get the product, consumers will be elated. But another result of waiting is that products have been sold out in the sales season. At this time, consumers are disappointed. Therefore, consumers waiting for purchase can obtain the product with probability ξ p , or with probability 1 − ξ p (denoted as ξ p ) of facing the risk of shortage. When the product is purchased at regular price p, the consumer's economic benefits is v − p. When consumers choose to wait, they may get economic benefits v − s with probability ξ p , or get zero with probability ξ p . According to formula (1), the utility of strategic consumers waiting for purchase is Figure 1 shows the decision tree of strategic consumers considering this kind of psychological factors. Obviously, when v−p > (v−s)ξ p −kξ p ξ p (v−s), the utility of purchasing immediately is greater than that of waiting for purchase, and consumers will choose to buy immediately. Otherwise, consumers choose to wait for purchase.
B. RETAILER'S DECISION MODEL
The profit function of the retailer is
where ''∧'' is the minimum operator, (x) + = max(x, 0). The retailer needs to decide the regular price p and the inventory quantity Q to maximize its profits. The price p will affect the decision of consumers whether to buy the product immediately. The inventory quantity Q will affect the probability that consumers who postpone purchases can get products in the residual market, and indirectly affects the decision of consumers whether to buy the product immediately. In order to maximize profits, the retailer will choose a price equals to their belief in consumers' reserve price, that is p = ξ r .
C. RATIONAL EXPECTATION EQUILIBRIUM
Definition 1: Rational Expectations Equilibrium (RE equilibrium). The strategy combination of consumers and the retailer (buy immediately, (p, Q)) is a RE equilibrium if and only if parameters (p, Q, r, ξ p , ξ r ) meet the following conditions:
Condition (i) indicates that consumers choose strategies to maximize their utility (buying at regular price or waiting to buy) based on their belief in the probability of obtaining products in the salvage market ξ p . Conditions (ii) and (iii) indicate that the retailer chooses the pricing and inventory that maximize its profit according to its belief in consumers' reserve price ξ r . The last two conditions require that the beliefs must be consistent with the actual results. (iv) indicates that if there is a consumer waiting, the belief must be consistent with the actual probability of obtaining the product. Because in equilibrium, the retailer prices the product at the consumer's reserve price and all consumers will buy the product. Only when X < Q, the consumer who waits can obtain the product at the residual price; and when X ≥ Q, the waiting consumer will face shortages. Therefore, when consumers waiting for sales, they will get the product with probability F(Q), which must be consistent with their belief ξ p , as shown in (iv). Since in practice, consumers who are interested in a particular product will pay more attention to the sales of that product, it is assumed that consumers waiting for the product are more likely to obtain the product in the residual market. Condition (v) indicates that retailer's belief in consumers' reserve price must be consistent with consumers' real reserve price.
According to the definition of the RE equilibrium, the solution of the equilibrium is equivalent to solving the following problems.
Lemma 1: In the RE equilibrium, all consumers buy immediately at regular price p; the optimal pricing and inventory quantity of the retailer are characterized by
where Q c is determined by F(Q c )
The subscript c stands for the situation without quantity commitment. Under the RE equilibrium, the profit function of the retailer is
IV. QUANTITY COMMITMENT STRATEGY
Can retailers get more profit when faced with strategic consumers? According to previous research [3] , quantity commitment is a feasible strategy. That is, the retailer promises to consumers that the inventory of the products is limited, and that the product will not be replenished after being sold out. This strategy can increase the profit of retailers by assuring consumers that products cannot be supplied in large quantities and increasing the probability of shortage [18] . Suppose that a retailer uses some means to convince consumers that they only sell Q unit of products throughout the sales season. In this situation, consumers no longer need to form rational expectations ξ p . Because of the quantity commitment, the inventory quantity Q of the retailer can be observed. When all other consumers choose to buy immediately at regular price p, the probability of waiting consumers obtaining the product in residual market at price s is F(Q). In other words, when a retailer promises to sell only Q unit products, the price consumers are willing to pay is
)F(Q) + kF(Q)F(Q)(v − s). At this point, the profit function of the retailer under quantity commitment is
Therefore, the optimal inventory quantity of the retailer is Q * q = arg max Q q (Q), and the pricing is
. Let * q denote the maximum profit of the retailer under the quantity commitment. The subscript q stands for quantity commitment. It should be emphasized that under quantity commitment, since Q can be observed, the retailer's pricing p(Q) is a function of inventory quantity Q; whereas in the absence of quantitative commitment, pricing p is determined by the RE equilibrium.
The optimal commitment quantity Q * q is determined by the equation q (Q) = 0, where
The optimal inventory quantity Q * c is determined by the equation c (Q) = 0, where
The order relationship of Q * q and Q * c can be obtained by analyzing formula (8) and (9) . The corresponding conclusion is given by proposition 1. All the proofs of propositions in this paper can be found in the appendix.
Proposition 1: When there are strategic consumers in the market and their disappointment aversion level is below a certain threshold, if the retailer adopts the quantity commitment strategy, then the optimal quantity of commitment must be less than the optimal inventory quantity when no quantitative commitment is adopted, that is Q * q < Q * c . Proposition 1 indicates that if the retailer decides to disclose the inventory quantity to strategic consumers, its optimal quantity must be lower than that of the non-disclosure situation. The strategy of disclosing inventory is essentially to deliver a signal to consumers that products are scarce. Intuitively, we generally think that the more information we know, the greater the benefits we can get from our decisions. However, because of the game relationship between consumers and retailers, the disclosure of inventory information to consumers cannot increase the consumer's revenue (utility). In fact, from Proposition 1, it can be seen that if the retailer makes a quantity commitment (disclosure of inventory information), it will reduce its inventory (Q * q < Q * c ). This will result in an increase in the equilibrium price (p * q > p * c , the proof can be found in the appendix of the proof of Proposition 1). An increase in the equilibrium price will reduce the utility of consumers.
In the following, we analyze how inventory quantity Q * q with quantity commitment (or Q * c without quantity commitment) and the corresponding profits * q (or * c ) vary with k when parameters c, v, s are fixed. In this situation, the optimal inventory Q * q and Q * c are functions of k, which are characterized by q (Q) = q (Q * q (k), k) = 0 and c (Q) = c (Q * c (k), k) = 0, respectively. Proposition 2 gives the corresponding conclusions.
Proposition 2: Suppose that there are strategic consumers in the market and their disappointment aversion level is below a certain threshold. (1) When quantity commitment strategy is adopted, both the retailer's optimal commitment quantity Q * q and maximum profit * q will increase with the increase of VOLUME 7, 2019 consumers' disappointment aversion level, that is
When quantity commitment strategy is not adopted, both the retailer's optimal inventory quantity Q * c and maximum profit * c will increase with the increase of consumers' disappointment aversion level, that is
> 0. Proposition 2 indicates that consumers' disappointment aversion preference can mitigate the adverse impact of their strategic behaviors on the retailer, in both quantity commitment and no quantity commitment situations. Intuitively, the consumer's disappointment aversion preference will reduce the utility of the consumer when the goods are out of stock, thus promoting strategic consumers to purchase in advance to prevent the product from being out of stock. The results we get are consistent with this intuition.
V. EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS OF QUANTITATIVE COMMITMENT STRATEGIES
The effectiveness of quantitative commitment refers to whether this strategy can bring more profits to the retailer. Thus, * q and * c need to be compared. Corresponding conclusions are given by proposition 3.
Proposition 3: There is a large range of parameters, which makes quantity commitment strategy effective, i.e. * q > * c holds. However, due to the existence of disappointment aversion consumers, there are also small parameter ranges, making the quantity commitment strategy ineffective. Specifically, when parameters c, v, s are fixed, there is critical value k > 0 (if c is not too large, or v is not too small, or s is not too small, then k = +∞); when k < k, the quantity commitment strategy is effective for the retailer, and the retailer can obtain more profits under the quantity commitment strategy, that is: * q > * c ; If c is large, or v is small, or s is small, then there are critical values of k 1 , k 2 , k 3 respectively. When k is larger than k 1 , k 2 , k 3 in each situation, respectively, then * q < * c , at this point, the quantity commitment strategy is ineffective for the retailer.
In the following, we perform sensitivity analysis on parameters. Specifically, we analyze how benefits of quantity commitment * q − * c are affected by parameters c, v, s and k one by one, respectively, when other parameters are fixed. Proposition 4 gives the corresponding conclusion. 
VI. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
We utilize two specific distributions, namely, when the random demand of consumers X obeys the uniform distribution U (5,15) and the normal distribution N(10,20) , respectively, to further corroborate the above conclusions by numerical experiments. retailer's profit and inventory quantity when quantity commitment is (or is not) adopted for fixed parameters s, c, v and five different levels of k. It is evident in Figure 2 (a) that when quantity commitment strategy is adopted, both the retailer's optimal commitment quantity Q * q and maximum profit * q will increase with the increase of consumers' disappointment aversion level for 0 ≤ k ≤ 2. In addition, Figure 2(b) reproduces the same conclusions in the other situation that quantity commitment strategy is not adopted.
The two figures give further verification and interpretation of Proposition 2 that consumers' disappointment aversion preference has positive effects on the retailer's inventory quantity and profits. By numerical calculation, we find that there is no essential difference in the results between the uniform distribution and the normal distribution.
FIGURE 3.
Comparisons between the two situations with or without quantity commitment when k changes. a) Optimal quantity Q * q (with quantity commitment) and Q * c (without quantity commitment); b) Maximum profit * q (with quantity commitment) and * c (without quantity commitment) for fixed s = 1, c = 2, v = 4 and X ∼ U [5, 15] . Figure 3 shows the differences in the optimal inventory quantity (or the maximum profit) with and without quantity commitment when parameters s, c, v are fixed and k changes. It is evident in Figure 3 (a) that when the retailer adopts the quantity commitment strategy, then the optimal quantity of commitment must be less than the optimal inventory quantity when no quantitative commitment is adopted, which further corroborates Proposition 1. In Figure 3(b) , comparisons between the maximum profit of the two situations have been given. It verifies that quantity commitment strategy is effective in the whole interval of 0 ≤ k ≤ 2 when s = 1, c = 2, v = 4, which is consistent with the parameter range in Proposition 3. By numerical calculation, we find that there is no essential difference in the results between the uniform distribution and the normal distribution. We will further verify the conditions in Proposition 3 under which the quantity commitment is ineffective in subsequent numerical experiments. Figure 4 shows the relationship between the maximum profit increment * q − * c of the retailer brought by quantity commitment strategy and disappointment aversion level k or product cost c, when salvage price s and consumers' valuation v are fixed. From the figure, we can see that when c is large (c ≥ 2.5), a relatively large value of k (the critical value depends on c) will make the quantity commitment strategy ineffective, that is * q < * c . This conclusion is completely consistent with the results in Proposition 3. The figure also depicts that the higher the cost of the product, the less advantage of the quantity commitment strategy, whilst c increases to a certain critical value, the quantity commitment strategy can be ineffective. The monotonic relationship between profit increment * q − * c and c or k further validates Proposition 4. By numerical calculation, we find that there is no essential VOLUME 7, 2019 difference in the results between the uniform distribution and the normal distribution. Figure 5 shows the relationship between the maximum profit increment * q − * c of the retailer brought by quantity commitment strategy and disappointment aversion level k or consumers' valuation v, when salvage price s and product cost c are fixed. From the figure, we can see that when v is small (v ≤ 3.1), a relatively large value of k (the critical value depends on v) will make the quantity commitment strategy ineffective, that is * q < * c . This conclusion is completely consistent with the results in Proposition 3. The figure also depicts that the higher the valuation of consumers, the more advantage of the quantity commitment strategy, whilst v decreases to a certain critical value, the quantity commitment strategy can be ineffective. The monotonic relationship between profit increment * q − * c and v or k further validates Proposition 4. By numerical calculation, we find that there is no essential difference in the results between the uniform distribution and the normal distribution. Figure 6 shows the relationship between the maximum profit increment * q − * c of the retailer brought by quantity figure, we can see that when s is small (s ≤ 0.15), a relatively large value of k (the critical value depends on s) will make the quantity commitment strategy ineffective, that is * q < * c . This conclusion is completely consistent with the results in Proposition 3. The figure also depicts that the higher the salvage price of the product, the more advantage of the quantity commitment strategy, whilst s decreases to a certain critical value, the quantity commitment strategy can be ineffective. The monotonic relationship between profit increment * q − * c and s or k further validates Proposition 4. By numerical calculation, we find that there is no essential difference in the results between the uniform distribution and the normal distribution.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Traditional research on consumers' strategic behavior only considers the economic benefits of consumers, and the impact of psychological satisfaction on their utility perception is usually ignored. In reality, consumers make decisions on when to buy mainly based on their rational forecasts and utility perceptions. This article considers one type of strategic consumers that have disappointment aversion preference. Quantity commitment is a strategy that retailers can be used to assure consumers that products cannot be supplied in large quantities. This strategy can alleviate the adverse effects of consumers' strategic behavior when consumers are neutral. However, we prove that when consumers are disappointment aversion, whether quantity commitment strategy is effective depends on the level of consumers' disappointment aversion and other external parameters. We systematically studied the applicable conditions of this strategy, and analyzed the impacts of various parameters on the profits increase brought by quantity commitment. This article can be extended in the following aspects. First of all, this paper only studies the impact of disappointment aversion strategic consumers on the retailer's optimal decision-making. The impact of this kind of consumers on the whole supply chain management can be investigated in future research. Then, this work is based on the assumption that all consumers have the same valuation of products. But in reality, consumers' valuation may be different. In future research, it is possible to analyze how the retailer or the entire supply chain can take actions when dealing with heterogeneous strategic consumers. Finally, this paper assumes that the salvage price in the residual market is fixed. In practice, this price may be related to the remaining inventory level. Usually, the higher the residual inventory level is, the lower the salvage price will be. Situations that the residual price depends on the remaining inventory level can be considered in future research.
APPENDIX

PROOF OF LEMMA 1
According to (2) , the retailer's profit function (
is a concave function of Q, and has a unique maximum. Let
. Lemma 1 has been proven.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
According to (8) 
Therefore, the equation q (Q) = 0 which determines Q * q has at least one root. Transforming the equation, we get
When k is small and distribution function F has an increasing failure rate, the left-hand-side is decreasing in Q, and the right-hand-side is increasing in Q. Therefore, Q * q is unique. Moreover, q (Q) increases first and then decreases with the increase in Q.
According to (9) , Q * c is characterized by
Because q (Q) increases first and then decreases with the increase in Q, and q (Q * q ) = 0, there must be Q * q < Q * c . Moreover, the equilibrium price with quantity commitment
, and the equilibrium price without quantity commitment is p * c = s
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Under the quantity commitment, the maximum profit *
Thus, we have 
and
respectively. Taking derivative of the two equations with respect to k, we can get
> 0 for small k. In fact, the right-hand-side of both equations is decreasing in k when k is small, thus both Q * q (k) and Q * c (k) increase in k. Proposition 2 has been proven.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
Firstly, we prove that when k is adequately small, for any fixed values of c, v and s, quantity commitment strategy is effective, that is * q > * c . According to the proof of proposition 1, when k is small,
and then begins to decrease as Q further increases.
and then begins to decrease as Q further increases. When k → 0, the difference of the two functions q (Q) − c (Q) at Q = Q c is approaching zero and the derivative of
Thus, we have * q > q (Q c ) = c (Q c ) = * c . Therefore, when k is adequately small, for any fixed values of c, v and s, quantity commitment strategy is effective, that is * q > * c . However, when k is relatively large while c also being large (or v being small, or s being small) simultaneous, the situation will be different. When k 0 (much greater than zero),
For large c, we consider the extreme case where c approaches v. When c → v, it is easy to prove that * q = q (Q * q ) < c (Q * c ) = * c . Therefore, when k is relatively large, there is critical value c(c depends on k), when c ≥ c, then * q < * c . In this case, quantity commitment strategy is ineffective. Other cases of v being small or s being small are similar.
Proposition 3 has been proven. Under fixed k, v, s, the maximum profit increment brought by quantity commitment strategy to the retailer is * q − * c = q (Q * q (k), k) − c (Q * c (k), k). According to the Envelop Theorem, we get
Similarly to the proof above, we can prove that there is critical value k, when k < k, then 
